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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to identify the effects of firm performance and governance indicators on the
credit rating of firms in the MENA region. We used ordered probit model considering a panel
structure with a dependent variable (credit rating) and six independent variables that include
financial ratios and governance indicators. This sample include 2463 firms during eight years
(2006-2013). The results of the initial model show that debt ratio, payout ratio, return on assets,
rule of law and market to book ratio are significant.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the financial market the word risk is often related to the possibility of an
investment loss. According to (Markowitz, 1952), risk was related to uncertainty,
represented by the variability of the expected return of a given asset. This leads to an
increase in the demand for information related to credit risk analysis and accordingly,
several analysis techniques have been developed. This have appeared significantly since
the 1980’s according to Callado, et al. (2008).
The first publicly available bond ratings was available in 1909 by John Moody.
He created an industry designed to foster the availability of information to financial
markets. A credit rating is an “opinion” offered by a Credit rating agency (CRA) about
the relative creditworthiness of a bond issuer, which include corporations, state and local
governments, and sovereign governments.
A firm’s credit rating reflects a rating agency’s opinion of an entity’s overall
creditworthiness and its capacity to satisfy its financial obligations (Standard and Poor’s
(2002)). A credit rating may be assigned to a particular debt issue, or it may indicate the
general ability of the firm to meet its obligations. The credit rating agencies determine
their ratings based on both public and private information, as well as their subjective
view of a company. Because investors cannot get a complete overview of the company’s
financial situation, many investors rely on rating agencies to get an accurate
representation of the debtor’s ability to repay the obligation and its overall financial
performance. This means that a favorable credit rating is very important to get beneficial
terms and conditions when firms issue debt on financial markets
The Financial Crisis of 2008 have revealed the over-reliance of the financial
system on the ratings of the credit rating agencies, particularly on those ones as the big
three of Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. Moody’s and S&P account for 80% of
the market, while Fitch’s share is only 15% (Duff and Einig, 2007). They take most of
the blame for their overly optimistic ratings of the mortgage subprime credit (Capitalized
Debt Obligations) which leads to the creation of the credit bubble of 2003-2007 and the
1

system’s near-collapse in 2008. During this period, 60% of all global structured products
were AAA-rated, while less than 1% of corporate issues were deserving this rate. This is
why it is believed that the expansion of mortgage would have been difficult without the
optimism and the approval of the credit rating agencies Coval, et al. (2009).
According to Han, et al. (2009) credit ratings, especially those issued by Standard
& Poor’s and Moody’s are critical to international investors who wish to invest in
corporate debt from emerging markets because:
(a) Financial information in emerging markets are much less transparent than in
developed markets.
(b) There are no reliable financial institutions in emerging markets that can certify the
eligibility of a debt to international investors.
(c) Many foreign institutional investors are not allowed to invest in speculative grade
bonds in emerging markets.
(d) Bank regulators use ratings for financial regulation, financial supervision and capital
adequacy rules.
Following the widespread problems with mortgage-backed structured finance
product ratings, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) amended rules
governing the conduct of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSROs). In late 2008, and again in late 2009, the SEC placed restrictions on conflicts
of interest arising from the issuer-pays business model (White 2010). Specifically,
NRSROs were requested to:
(1) Disclose historical ratings actions;
(2) Not allow to structure and then rate an issue; and
(3) Disclose payment amounts and any potential conflicts of interest.
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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 further
directed federal agencies to remove any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit
ratings.
This is the first study that provides insights about the dynamics of the MENA
stock markets. It covers 10 stock markets in the MENA region. The test period of this
study is from 2006 to 2013 to reflect most of the political and other significant events the
MENA region passed by. This study focuses on examining the determinants of credit
ratings in the MENA region,
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section II presents the literature
review of the main studies of these areas. Section III presents the data, and methodology
used in this thesis. Section IV provides the results of this empirical study and section V
concludes with areas for future research.

3

CHAPTER II

Literature Review

2.1 Definition of credit rating
Almost all the ratings are defined by symbols. These rating symbols are intended
to reflect the same general level of creditworthiness for issuers and issues regardless of
different sectors, industries, and at different times. Standard & Poor’s (2011) believed
that credit ratings express the agency’s opinion about the ability and willingness of an
issuer to meet its financial obligations in full and on time. In addition, the CRAs are
expected to provide information to debt market participants beyond those publicly
available sources (e.g: Reiter and Zeibart, 1991; Ederington et al., 1987). Credit rating is
an indicator of a firm’s default risk and express a relative measure of credit risk, based on
the analysis of quantitative and qualitative variables.
2.2 Rating changes
Credit rating should change over time according to firm performance. Altman and
Kao (1992) find that rating changes tend to exhibit serial correlation. This means a
downgrade is more likely to be followed by a subsequent downgrade than by an upgrade.
Also, Lucas and Lonski (1992) studied Moody’s ratings and showed that the number of
firms downgraded has increasingly exceeded the number of firms upgraded over time.
This can be explained either by the quality of firms has declined through time or rating
standards have become stricter. Lo¨ffler (2002) explained this by observing that the
agencies appear to have an additional objective of avoiding near-term reversals in their
rating assignments. This was confirmed by Lando and Skødeberg (2002) who developed
a model that states that the rating changes are not independent.
In addition credit ratings are expected to vary according to the state of the
business cycle. For instance, bank loan standards tend to be most lax during economic
booms (Lown et al., 2000) and banking supervisors have historically been most vigilant
4

during downturns (Syron, 1991).

In addition, Bangia et al. (2002) documented an

empirical significance of the pro-cyclical of credit quality changes by showing that
estimated credit losses are much higher in a contraction relative to an expansion.
Amato and Furfine (2004) did a very important study. They examined the
influence of the state of the business cycle on credit ratings using the annual data on all
US firms rated by Standard & Poors. They developed a model of rating determination
that takes into account factors that measure the business and financial risks of firms, in
addition to indicators of macroeconomic conditions. Their results show that ratings do
not generally exhibit excess sensitivity to the business cycle.
On the other hand, Fons (2002) points out that markets prefer stability in ratings
due to a desire for “ratings to be a view of an issuer’s relative fundamental credit risk,
which they perceive to be a stable measure of intrinsic financial strength.” Also, Moody’s
states that ratings are meant to be representative of long-term horizon and thus only
adjust ratings when they are confident a company’s risk profile is permanently adjusted.

2.3 Determinants of credit rating
2.3.1 Effect of firm performance on firm’s credit rating
One of the early studies on determinants and characteristics of the bonds issuing
firms was conducted by Horrigan (1966). He used two-step analytical approach in order
to predict the bond rating based on financial ratios and characteristics of ratings. He has
explained 65 percent of variation in the bond rating and also found that total assets have
the most significant impact on bond ratings. Altman (1968) used five financial ratios such
as working capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, earnings before interest
and taxes total assets, market value of equity to book value of total assets, and sales to
total asset to predict the bankruptcy. The study concluded that these variables have
statistically significant effects in a default prediction exercise and the model is found to
be highly accurate for predicting bankruptcy.
Pinches and Mingo (1973) used financial ratios to predict the industrial bond
ratings. They have used six financial ratios such as earnings ratios, debt ratios, total
5

assets, working capital ratios, net income sales worth, debt and debt coverage ratios and
means for percentage changes in sales. Their model is unable to correctly predict 69.70
per cent of the actual ratings in the original sample, and predicted approximately 60 per
cent of the ratings for a holdout sample and another sample of newly rated bonds. In
addition, Ederington (1985) has used interest coverage, the long term debt to capital ratio,
and total assets in his research for comparison of bond rating models and statistical
methods. The financial ratios used in this study have statistically significant impact on
credit ratings.
In 1998, Blume, et al. did a study on the declining quality of U.S corporate
governance debt. They used a panel regression from 1978 to 1995 using the following
financial ratios: pre-tax interest coverage, operating income to sales, long term debt to
assets, total debt to assets, and total assets. They concluded that the long term ratio is
significantly related to credit ratings although the total debt ratio is insignificant. This can
be explained by high correlation between these two variables or due to multicollinearity
as mentioned by Amato and Furne (2004). Kamstra, et al. (2001) employed net income
plus interest expenses divided by interest expenses to represent interest coverage, a debt
ratio measured by total debt divided by total assets, profitability captured by the net
income total assets ratio, and firm size measured as book value of firm assets. They find
that the debt ratio is negatively related to credit ratings whereas return on asset is
positively related to credit ratings. The firm’s size significantly affects ratings and leads
to higher credit ratings. On the contrary interest coverage has no significant impact on
ratings thus they suggested that interest coverage did not determine the credit ratings.
Adams and Hardwick (2003) examined the determinants of external credit ratings
attained by insurance firms in the United Kingdom (UK) and of the likelihood that
insurers will have such an assessment. Using panel data relating to A.M. Best-rated and
Standard and Poor's (S&P)-rated insurers over the period 1993–1997, a trichotomous
logit model and an ordered probit model with sample selection are employed to show that
the factors which influence the likelihood of having external credit assessments not only
vary between the two agencies but also differ from those which determine the ratings
themselves. The findings proposed that higher ratings can achieved through higher levels
6

of profitability and liquidity. Furthermore, there is inverse relationship between ratings
and leverage because lower financial leverage leads to higher credit ratings.
In addition, Gray, et al. (2006) worked on determinants of Australian credit
ratings by testing the association between financial ratios and industry variables. They
have taken profitability, leverage, cash flow ratios and interest coverage ratios. They used
ordered probit model approach and their results revealed that leverage ratios and interest
coverage have significant effect on credit ratings. It was also observed that industry
variables and profitability ratios have very important impact on credit ratings in
evaluating determinants of Australian credit ratings. In addition, the results reflected that
Financial variables are helpful in discriminating between A- and BBB-rated firms, but are
less precise in separating AA- and A-rated firms.
Tanthanongsakkunm and Treepongkaruna (2008) used both the market based
model and accounting based model and examined if they can explain the credit ratings.
They take market to book ratios and firm size proxy for market based model and debt
leverage ratios and interest coverage ratio for accounting based model. They employed
ordered probit model methodology on Australian companies that are rated by Standard
and Poor's during 1992–2003. The results showed the likely relationships between the
credit ratings and all independent variables and that the market-based model is more
informative in explaining credit ratings than the accounting-based model.
Rashid and Abbas (2011) conducted study to detect the financial ratios that are
most significant in bankruptcy prediction for the non-financial sector of Pakistan based
on a sample of companies which became bankrupt over the time period 1996-2006. They
used twenty four financial ratios to measure financial characteristics of companies (e.g.:
profitability, liquidity, leverage, and turnover ratios). These ratios were examined for a
five-year period before bankruptcy. The discriminant analysis produced a parsimonious
model of three variables sales to total assets, EBIT to current liabilities, and cash flow
ratio. Their results provided evidence that the firms having Z-value below zero fall into
the “bankrupt” whereas the firms with Z-value above zero fall into the “non-bankrupt”
category. The model used in this study achieved 76.9% prediction accuracy when it is
applied to forecast bankruptcies on their sample.
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Al-Khawaldeh (2012) has conducted study on determinants of credit ratings. Firm
specific variables used in the study are profitability, leverage, capital intensity, growth
opportunity and firm size while audit quality is used as corporate governance proxy. The
results confirmed that firm characteristics variables have significant impact on firm’s
credit ratings. Profitability has positive impact on credit rating for all models, while
leverage and loss propensity are negatively associated with credit ratings for all models.
Capital intensity results are insignificant. The growth potential which is measured by
Tobin’s Q and firm size are highly positively associated with credit ratings. On the other
hand, type of sector and audit are not related to credit rating.
Gonis, Paul, and Tucker (2012) examined the main determinants of the rating
likelihood of UK companies. They used a binary probit specification to model the main
drivers of a firm's propensity to be rated. The sample used covers 245 non-financial UK
companies over the period 1995–2006, representing up to 2872 firms over the years. In
addition, this study has established important differences in the financial profiles of rated
and non-rated firms and paid specific attention to the time dimension for the factors that
drive the rating decision. The results of this study reflect five key findings; a- the
likelihood of obtaining a rating is negatively related to a company’s leverage and
positively related to its financial flexibility. b- Outstanding debt, the choice of bonds as a
financing method, and past/future issuance of public debt, are all positively related to
soliciting credit ratings. c- Default risk, represented by the book to market ratio, is
significant across the specifications and different models. d- In terms of model
specification, this study finds that the contemporaneous and predictive specifications
provide similar results and are equally efficient in classifying accurately the propensity to
get rated within-sample. e- This study addresses a notable omission in the credit rating
literature by providing a testable conceptual framework for the modelling of rating
likelihood.

2.3.2 Effect of governance indicators on firm’s credit rating
It is commonly accepted that the business environment that includes legal,
regulatory, financial, and institutional system of a country has an impact on the
8

performance of firms. Because the barriers of doing business varied across regions and
countries; this for sure will affect the aggregate performance of the business environment
at both firm and country level.
One of these factors is the political stability. This is an important factor in
explaining variation in financial development around the world. Goldsmith (1994)
mentioned, the democratization efforts were thought by many to promote greater political
freedom and stability and, in turn, enhanced attractiveness for lending and investment
purposes. In addition, Roe and Siegel (2011) reported that that variation in political
stability has a significant, consistent, and substantial impact over many decades on debt
and stock market development. In addition,
Block and Vaaler (2004) find that average agency ratings for developing countries
decline during election years. They find an additional decline of approximately one level
during election years, holding constant a set of macroeconomic control variables thought
to explain sovereign ratings. In addition, their results show that bond spreads are greater
in the pre-election than in the postelection periods, and that they decline as elections
approach.
Another variable of the governance indicators is the rule of law. This measures the
confidence the agents and firms have in abiding the rules of the society. According to the
United Nations; Rule of law means “a principle of governance in which all persons,
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and
which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and
procedural and legal transparency”.
La Porta, et al. (2000) explain the large difference in ownership public traded
firms among countries by how well investors including shareholders and creditors, are
protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of
firms.
9

Bushman, et al. (2004) reported that governance transparency is primarily related
to the legal/judicial regime, whereas financial transparency is primarily related to the
political regime. Their results show that governance transparency is higher in countries
with a legal/judicial regime characterized by a common law legal origin and high judicial
efficiency. On the other hand, financial transparency is higher in countries with low state
ownership of enterprises, low state ownership of banks, and low risk of state
expropriation of firms’ wealth.
Qian and Strahan (2007) reported that legal differences shape the ownership and
terms of bank loans across the world. Their multidimensional empirical model results
show that loans have longer maturities, and lower interest rates under strong creditor
protection. Their results confirmed the findings of Demirgüç‐Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998) who investigated how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms' use
of external financing to fund growth. Their findings show that in countries whose legal
systems score high on an efficiency index, a greater proportion of firms’ use long-term
external financing. In addition, Kisgen and Strahan (2010) reported that that bond
regulations affect yields which in turn affect credit rating.
Also, Domadenik, et al. (2014) used a game theoretic model and find that
underdeveloped democratic institutions do not punish political corruption which comes
from political connectedness of firms which leads to a negative effect on performance.

2.4 Quality of credit rating
Rating agencies are supposed to provide an independent opinion on the credit
quality of issuers. However, if market participants rely on credit ratings for investment
decisions, then credit ratings themselves affect the credit quality of issuers. This
increased the criticism about the performance of the credit rating agencies. Also, previous
work on rating agencies have also focused on how the conflicts of interest between
investors and information intermediaries affect the quality of the information disclosed to
the market. Credit ratings can affect strongly the relationships with third parties,
including the employees of the firm, suppliers to the firm, financial counterparties, or
customers of the firm. The common criticism of credit rating agencies include flawed
10

methodologies (IOSCO, 2008); a lack of transparency Parker et al. (2008); inherent
conflicts of interest within the Credit Rating Agencies business model (US Senate
Committee, 2008); poor communication (FSA, 2008); Credit Rating Agencies staff
resourcing (CESR, 2008); and extreme product complexity resulting in a lack of
understanding among users (Chung and van Duyn, 2008).
Questioning the credibility of the credit rating agencies increased after the failure of those
rating agencies to predict insolvency accurately was discussed by Klein (1992); Ambrose
and Seward (1988); Ambrose and Carroll (1994); and Carson and Scott (1997). Cantor
and Packer (1995) mentioned that Credit rating agencies deal closely with issuers of
corporate securities and often use both quantitative and qualitative information when
formulating their rating of a company’s financial condition. Usually, this information
come from public and private sources. Lizzeri (1999) considers the optimal disclosure
policy of an information intermediary who can perfectly observe the type of the seller at
zero cost, and finds that in equilibrium the information intermediary does not disclose
any information. In addition, Doherty, Kartasheva, and Phillips (2009) and Camanho,
Deb, and Liu (2010) examined how competition between rating agencies affects
information disclosed to investors. Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) studied rating inflation
due to preferential-regulatory treatment of highly rated securities.
Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) developed
models that showed that investors behavioral biases cause rating inflation. Fulghieri,
Strobl, and Xia (2010) study the welfare effects of unsolicited credit ratings. On the other
hand, Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) developed a model in which credit rating
shave a real impact on the firm's choice between a risky and a safe project. In their
model, if some investors base their decisions on the announcements of rating agencies,
then rating agencies can discipline the firm, inducing first-best project choice.

2.5 Hypotheses Development
Description of this study’s methodological aspects is divided into three parts.
First, we describe the hypotheses and the variables and proxies we will use, together with
11

its theoretical justifications. Second, the model statistical technique are discussed.
Finally, data collection steps and the study’s sample are presented.
Financial ratios were collected from the Thomson Reuters- Eikon for deriving
their financial ratios. Four firm specific financial variables were used in this study.
Previous bond-rating prediction studies. Financial leverage, and profitability were
selected as potential determinants of bond ratings of firms. In addition, I used market to
book ratio & Payout ratio to examine if the performance of the stock in the stock market
and dividend policy have any relation to credit rating. In addition, we used two country
governance indicators including political stability and the rule of law
To identify the determinants of credit ratings, six hypotheses were formulated, which are
Presented below.
2.5.1 Profitability
ROA, which is net income divided by total assets, is a measure of a firm’s
profitability relevant to total investment in this study. Logue and Merville (1972)
proposed that high profitability lowers the probability of business failure, thus lowering a
firms overall risk. Scherrer and Mathison (1996) argued that high profitability helps
stabilize operating cash flow, thus reducing the risk of the firm. Because a firm with high
profitability has greater ability to pay off its borrowed funds, profitability is expected to
correlate with bond ratings in a positive fashion.
H1: Firms that are more profitable should have better credit ratings.
2.5.2 Leverage:
Debt ratio, which is a ratio of long-term debt to total assets, was used as a proxy
of a firm’s financial leverage in this study. High financial leverage means that the
company has high financial burden to pay debt holders. Van Horne (1998) argued that as
the financial leverage increases, investors’ exposure to financial risk increase and the
volatility of earnings increase. Firms with high financial leverage have high percentage of
cash outflow going to fixed coverage, they have higher financial risk, and thus lower
bond ratings. Therefore, financial leverage is expected to be inversely related to bond
ratings.
H3: Firms that are less leveraged have better credit ratings.
12

2.5.3 Performance in the financial market
Market to Book (M/B) is the market value of common equity divided by the book
of common equity at the end of year t. Firms with higher M/B represent high-growth
firms that could be associated with greater risk. This suggests that M/B will be positively
associated with bond yields and negatively associated with credit ratings. Fama and
French (1998) found that value stocks outperform growth stocks in twelve of thirteen
major markets during the 1975-1995 period. In addition, Abhyankar, et al. (2009)
investigated value vs growth investment strategy in the G7 country. Their results show
that value stocks dominate growth stocks in US, Canada, and Japan; while there are no
significant dominance relations between value and growth portfolios in the remaining
countries.
H4: Firms that have a lower M/B firms in the financial market should have a better
credit ratings
2.5.4 Payout ratio
Payout ratio (POUT) is calculated as dividend per share divided by earning per
share. A firm that has relatively stable earnings is often able to predict approximately
what its future earnings will be. Such a firm is therefore more likely to pay out a higher
percentage of its earnings than a firm with fluctuating earnings. In other studies, Rozeff
(1982), Lloyd et al. (1985), and Collins et al. (1996) used beta value of a firm as an
indicator of its market risk. They found statistically significant and negative relationship
between beta and the dividend payout. Their findings suggest that firms having a higher
level of market risk will pay out dividends at lower rate. D’Souza (1999) also finds
statistically significant and negative relationship between beta and dividend payout. This
leads us to believe that firms with higher payout ratio have higher credit rating. It is
worth mentioning that the inclusion of this variable is unprecedented in determinant
rating studies and has not been tested previously by other authors.
H5: Firms with higher payout ratio should have a better credit rating
13

2.5.5 Political stability
Political stability (PS) reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including
politically-motivated violence and terrorism (World Bank, 2014). It is measured by
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Political stability number reflects the
percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank). Strong
political institutions or political stability protect bondholders from uninformed
government actions that would negatively affect bondholders’ return on investment
which in turn will negatively affect the credit rating. Qi. Et al. (2010) find that higher
political rights are associated with significantly higher ratings for corporate bonds issued
in both the Eurobond and the Yankee bond markets. In addition, Roe (2006) find that
political stability are important in shaping a country’s financial development.
H5: Firms in countries that have higher political stability should have a better credit
rating

2.5.6 Rule of law
Rule of Law (ROL) “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence” (World Bank, 2014).
It is measured by Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Rule Of Law number
reflects the percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest)
rank). Mansi, et al. (2009) stated that firms incorporated in states with more restrictive
payout statutes have better credit ratings than do firms incorporated in less restrictive
states. There results suggest that the explanation is the more restrictive state provides a
credible commitment mechanism for avoiding some of the moral hazard problems
associated with long‐term debt. In addition, A number of authors (Fuerst (1998); Stulz
14

(1999); Coffee, (1999)) hypothesize that firm value is increased by bonding to a stricter
set of laws and standards.
H7: Firms in countries that have a higher rule of law should have a better credit
rating

15

CHAPTER III
Data and Methodology

3.1 Data Description
The initial sample of this study consist of all stocks listed in the MENA region
stock markets that have been rated by StarMine CCR between 2006 & 2013. The MENA
Region includes 10 countries:

Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,

Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. The issuer credit ratings are obtained
primarily through Thomson Reuters Eikon database.

The Worldwide Governance

Indicators (WGI) variables comes from World Bank database. Also, years for which
complete financial information was unavailable are excluded from the sample. In
addition, financial sector firms are not included in the sample due to significant
differences in the accounting standards and the interpretation of several financial ratios
(leverage in particular). Finally, we cleaned the data from outliers and convert credit
rating symbol to a number to be able to use it in our model. The total number of ratings
observations that meet the above criteria, and therefore form our initial sample, 2463
firms over the eight years
3.1.1 StarMine Credit Rating
The StarMine Combined Credit Risk Model (StarMine CCR) is used to evaluate
corporate credit risk. It provide its daily scores via Thomson Reuters Eikon, Datastream
Professional, and as a daily data feed. It combines the power of StarMine’s three credit
risk models; the StarMine Text Mining Credit Risk Model, the StarMine SmartRatios
Credit Risk Model and the StarMine Structural Credit Risk Model to generate a single,
final estimate of public company credit risk. StarMine was able to predict accurately
90.4% of default events within a 12-month horizon in its bottom quintile of scored
companies.
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StarMine developed a corporate credit risk model that assess a company’s default
risk through both the accounting ratio analysis and the contingent claims analysis. In
addition, StarMine’s credit risk model includes a novel third approach that applies
cutting-edge machine learning algorithms to mining textual data for information
regarding a company’s financial health. Each of these three powerful models provides
unique insights into a company’s credit default risk:
1- The StarMine Structural Credit Risk Model (StarMine SCR): the evaluation of the
credit risk from the equity market’s view via StarMine’s proprietary extension of the
Merton structural default prediction framework that models a company’s equity as a call
option on its assets. It is broken down into three primary components: leverage, asset
drift, and volatility.
2- The StarMine SmartRatios Credit Risk Model (StarMine SRCR): It assess credit risk
using financial ratios and incorporates both reported information and forward-looking
estimates via the StarMine SmartEstimate. The ratios used to assess the firms are shown
in the appendix Table (1).
3- The StarMine Text Mining Credit Risk Model (StarMine TMCR): it mines the language
in textual data from different sources including Reuters News, StreetEvents conference
call transcripts, corporate filings, and select broker research reports to assess companies’
potential financial distress. The construction of this model is shown in the appendix
Figure (2).
StarMine CCR combines the outputs from StarMine SCR, StarMine SRCR, and StarMine
TMCR in a logistic regression framework, in which the probability of default, P, is
modeled by

where α is the intercept term, β is a vector of the coefficients in need of calibration, and X
is a matrix containing the explanatory variables. In this case α incorporates the effect of
the company’s region on the credit risk, and X includes the outputs from the three
StarMine credit risk models. A measure of past changes in StarMine SCR is also included
in X, as the research revealed that momentum exists in credit risk, particularly with
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StarMine SCR and particularly when credit risk is deteriorating. A rapidly deteriorating
SCR score indicates a greater probability of further deterioration in the future.
From this formula the probability that a company will default within 12 months can be
obtained using the linear combination of the explanatory variables. The parameters are
calibrated through maximum likelihood estimation.
Figure 1: construction of StarMine CCR

Source: Thomason Reuters

The volume of text on a given company determine the weights allotted to StarMine
TMCR and the other two models. The weight on StarMine TMCR increases with higher
text volume.
The results show that StarMine TMCR generates more predictive scores when it
has sufficient textual data to analyze which comes from higher text volume. StarMine
CCR achieves its strong predictive power through the additive strength of its three
distinct component models, and by incorporating information not utilized by any other
commercial credit risk model.
It is worth mentioning that Starmine CCR outperformed Starmine SCR &Altman
Z-score in their credit rating performance around the world and in all years (1999-2010)

18

To be able to use this credit rating index we have to convert its rating into numbers to be
able to use it in the model. 20 is the best credit rating & 1 is the worst credit rating for
any firm.

Table 1: Implied Credit Rating and its conversion to credit rating number
Implied Letter Rating

Credit rating number

AAA

20

AA+

19

AA

18

AA-

17

A+

16

A

15

A-

14

BBB+

13

BBB

12

BBB-

11

BB+

10

BB

9

BB-

8

B+

7

B

6

B-

5

CCC+

4

CCC

3

CCC-

2

CC

1

3.2 Methodology
The model used in this study is the ordered probit model which is intended to
solve problems with the ordinal nature. This model was developed by McKelvey and
Zavoina (1975) and used by Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998) and Pottier, and
Sommer (1999).This statistical technique is designed for empirical studies in which the
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dependent variable is discrete and takes on a finite number of values that possess a
natural ordering.
In this paper the ordered probit model have a dependent variable that are ordered
categories which is the credit rating.

CR = β0 +β1ROAt-1 +β2DRt-1 + β3M/Bt-1 + β4POUTt-1 + β5PSt-1 + β6ROL t-1 +εit
Where (CR) is the credit rating number, (ROA) is the return on assets, (DR) is the
Debt Ratio, (M/B) is the Market to Book ratio, (POUT) is the Payout Ratio, (PS) is
the political stability, (ROL) is the rule of law, and (εit) are normal random errors.
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CHAPTER IV

Results

4.1 Descriptive statistics for credit rating
Table 2 show the descriptive statistics of credit rating in each country. It shows
mean, median, standard deviation of each country. In addition, it shows the minimum and
maximum credit rating and the number of observations in each country. The results show
that the Saudi Arabia has the biggest proportion of our sample followed by Egypt. On the
other hand the lowest proportion comes from Dubai. This can be explained by absence of
credit rating for companies in Dubai Stock market before year 2012. We find that Tunisia
has the highest mean and median which means that the firms in Tunisia have the best
credit rating. Surprisingly, the lowest average credit rating was in Israel although it is
considered one of the most important markets in the MENA country.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of credit rating for the sample countries
Country
Mean
Median Standard
Minimum Maximum
Deviation

No. of
Observations

Abu Dhabi

14.253

15

2.960

6

19

99

Dubai

14.053

15

4.236

7

20

19

Egypt

14.165

14

3.013

5

20

484

Israel

12.532

13

3.407

3

20

370

Jordan

15.350

16

3.099

6

20

329

Kuwait

13.754

14

3.203

6

20

191

Morocco

15.415

16

2.760

7

20

289

Qatar

15.385

16

3.176

5

20

122

Saudi Arabia

14.066

14

3.428

3

20

519

Tunisia

16.756

17

2.896

11

20

41

Table 3 show average credit rating in each year. We choose this period because it takes
into consideration the effects of the financial crises and Political or revolutionary events
that take place in the MENA region on the credit rating. Although financial systems in
MENA countries have not been highly exposed to the crisis due to their limited
integration with global financial institutions, the impact of the global recession on the real
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economy can be significant in many MENA countries. The start of the Arab spring in
2011 was a turning point event. In addition to its economic, financial and social effects, it
leads to downgrade the credit rating of these countries many times and have a significant
effect on the stock markets. The lowest mean was in year 2007 which can be explained as
the effect of the global financial crises that appeared in September 2007 and decrease the
credit rating of most of the firms around the world. The largest number of observations is
year 2013 followed by 2012 because of the addition of the firms listed in Dubai stock
market
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of credit rating of the sample period
Year
Mean
Median
Standard
Minimum
Deviation

Maximum

No. of
Observations

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

208
254
291
304
325
341
363
377

14.740
13.961
15.010
12.099
14.117
14.865
14.592
14.735

15
14
15
12
14
15
15
15

2.899
3.234
2.839
3.672
2.987
3.051
3.499
3.239

4
5
7
3
5
6
5
3

Ratings agencies suggest that credit ratings should also depend partly on the firm’s
business environment. Many industry characteristics can have a significant influence on
the level of business risk a firm faces like competitiveness, exposure to technological
change, barriers to entry, and vulnerability to economic cycles This is why the inclusion
of industry types into a model of credit ratings as a measure of industry effects may
improve the explanatory power. According to Hawawini, and Subramanian (2001)
Industry factors may have a large impact on firm performance.
Table 4 show that the best rating sector is the medical sector. It outperformed the
technology & petroleum Sector. Also, it worth mentioning that Real estate sector has the
lowest mean. This can be explained by the financial crises in 2007 which was its main
reason the real estate sector.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the credit rating of the industry sectors
Sector
Mean
Median Standard
Minimum Maximum
Deviation

No.Of
Observations

Agriculture

14.155

15

3.402

6

20

58

Heavy industries

14.634

15

3.398

3

20

593

Industrial

14.490

15

3.154

3

20

725

Leisure

14.473

14

3.058

6

20

74

Medical

16.044

16

2.512

8

20

90

Other services

14.758

16

3.037

6

20

128

Petroleum

13.514

14

3.354

4

20

111

Real estate

13.183

14

3.353

3

20

436

Retail

14.243

14

3.185

6

20

103

Technology

14.164

15

3.515

5

20

128

Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in this study.
An important finding is the large variation in the political stability variable where the
minimum is 6.604 and the maximum is 91.943. The minimum is in Egypt in year
2011.this is explained by the revolution; while the maximum number is for Qatar in year
2013. The average profitability is 5.7% which means that the firms in the sample are
profitable and can face the risk of default. The average M/B is 2.139 which means that
these firms are performing good in the financial market.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the Financial Ratios and Governance Indicators
Variables
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
DR
M/B
POUT
ROA
PS
ROL

0.243
2.139
0.372
0.057
32.466
60.357

0.211
1.57
0.389
0.05
29.717
60.664

0.192
6.12
0.335
0.086
20.484
11.499

0
-166.92
0
-1.31
6.604
34.123

1.156
72.09
1
0.44
91.943
83.412

Count
2463
2463
2463
2463
2462
2463

We divided our sample into high credit rating group and low credit rating group.
High credit rating group: The firms which have a credit rating number from (11 to 20).
Low credit rating group: The firms which have a credit rating number from (1 to 10).
Table 6 shows that debt ratio of low credit rating group is double the debt ratio of the
high credit rating group. In addition, it shows that return on assets of high credit rating
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group is very high comparing to low credit rating group (6.5% comparing to 0.8%). The
market to book and payout policy come as we expected in literature. We find that high
credit rating firms have higher market to book ratio and higher payout policy.
Table 6: Test of Equality for high credit rating group and lower credit rating group

DR

High credit rating group
M/B
POUT
ROA

DR

Low credit rating group
M/B
POUT

ROA

Variables
Mean

0.215

2.296

0.409

0.065

0.410

1.223

0.159

0.008

Median

0.179

1.650

0.441

0.056

0.409

1.120

0.000

0.012

Standard Deviation

0.175

5.331

0.332

0.087

0.206

9.447

0.266

0.066

4.2 Empirical Results
As our data presented a panel structure, we have conducted an unbalanced panel data
analysis to assure the validity of the statistical tests. The correlation matrix for the
study’s independent variables is presented in Table 7.This Table shows that there is no
high correlation between the variables used to measure the determinants of credit rating.
In other words the data used don’t have a multicollinearity problem.
Table 7: Correlation Matrix
Variables
DR
M/B
POUT
ROA
PS
ROL

DR
1
0.036
-0.234
-0.287
-0.12
0.332

M/B

POUT

ROA

PS

ROL

1
0.087
0.06
-0.041
-0.028

1
0.421
0.019
-0.12

1
-0.005
-0.091

1
0.324

1

Using the ordered probit model, the results in table 8 show that return on assets, leverage,
payout ratio, and rule of law were significant at 1%. In addition to Market to book which
is significant at 10%. The results go with what we expected and what we found in other
literature. The profitability have a positive effect on credit rating especially return on
assets who have a significant positive effect on determining credit rating. Leverage
measured by debt ratio has a negative significant effect. Also, the payout ratio show that
it has significant positive effect on credit rating. The surprise in the POUT is its high
positive coefficient (0.839). The M/B is the only significant variable at 10%. It shows
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that M/B almost have no effect on credit rating because of its very low coefficient.
Finally the results show that Rule of law has a small positive effect on credit rating. The
Pseudo R-squared of this model is 12.4%.
Table 8: Results of the ordered probit model
This table presents results for the ordered probit model that incorporates financial and governance
variables. The sample period is from 2006 to 2013 adjusted to be from 2007 to 2013. Coefficients with 1%
significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *.
Variables
Credit Rating Coefficient
-3.539***
DR
(-24.234)
M/B

-0.008*
(-1.861)

POUT

0.839***
(11.031)

ROA

4.064***
(13.648)

PS

0.002
(5.141)

ROL

0.012***
(5.141)

Pseudo R-squared

0.124
(1.354)

No Of Observations

2024

4.3 Additional Tests
We measure the effect of global financial crises on the credit rating during the
period (2008-2010). This period stopped at 2010 to exclude the effect of revolutionary
and political events in MENA region
The results of the after financial crises Period in table 9 show that all financial
ratios are significant. All the variables are significant at 1% and none of the governance
indicators were significant. This can be explained by that the rating agencies learned
from the financial crisis and improved their performance in evaluating the firms.
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Table 9: Results of the effects of financial crises on the determinants of credit rating
This table presents results for the ordered probit model that incorporates financial and governance
variables. The sample period is from 2007 to 2010 adjusted to be from 2008 to 2010. The Coefficients with
1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *.
Variable

Credit Rating Coefficient
-3.521***
(-15.227)

DR
-0.069***
(-4.623)
M/B
0.609***
(5.071)
POUT
4.193***
(8.902)
ROA
0.001
(0.325)
PS
ROL

0.004
(0.784)

Pseudo R-squared

0.119

No. of Observations

808

The last test was on the effect of revolution on credit rating in Egypt and Tunisia.
Tunisia had a revolution on December 2010 and Egypt’s revolution is on January 2011.
Table 10 show the difference in the determinants of credit rating before and after the
revolution. The results show that all the variables were significant at 1% before the
revolution and after the revolution except for M/B which is significant only before the
revolution. The results agree with the previous literature, but it shows that ROA have less
effect & and DR have a stronger effect after the revolution. Also, surprisingly the
Political stability (significant variables in both periods) increased in a very small rate
from 9.5 % to 9.8%. The results show that this model is explaining better after the crises
than before the crises with Pseudo R-squared 18.2% comparing to 13.9%.
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Table 10: Effect of revolution on the determinants of credit rating on Egypt and Tunisia
This table presents results for the ordered probit model that incorporates financial and governance
variables. The sample of before the revolution period for is from 2006 to 2010 adjusted to be from 2007 to
2010. The sample of after the revolution period is from 2011 to 2013. Coefficients with 1% significance are
followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *.
Variable

Before Revolution

After Revolution

DR

-2.639***

-3.543***

(-5.734)

(-7.865)

-0.094***

-0.065

(-4.079)

(-1.567)

0.723***

1.122***

(-3.208)

-5.286

8.156***

7.036***

(-7.313)

-6.848

0.095***

0.098***

(-4.882)

-6.848

-0.173***

-0.143***

(-3.597)

(-4.949)

Pseudo R-squared

0.139

0.182

No of Observations

218

275

M/B
POUT
ROA
PS
RL
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CHAPTER V

Conclusion

This study aimed to identify the effect of the financial ratios and governance
indicators of credit ratings in MENA region. We built an Ordered Probit Model using a
panel structure data. The sample comprised a total of 2463 credit rating observations
issued to companies excluding financial sector operating in the stock market of MENA
region during the period 2006-2013 by StarMine CCR agency. The debt ratio, market to
book, payout ratio, return on assets, and rule of law were significant.
We did additional test on the effect of financial crises on the determinants of
credit rating. The results show that debt ratio, market to book, payout ratio, and return on
assets are the significant variables. The last test was on the effect of revolution on
determinants of credit rating on Egypt and Tunisia. We find all the variables are
significant except market to book ratio.
The limitation of this paper is not using Standards and Poor or Moody’s credit
rating as they are the most popular. For the future research, we suggest analysis the effect
of macroeconomic and corporate governance factors on the firm’s credit rating. In
addition, we would like to extend this analysis to private firms in the MENA region as it
is still unclear.
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Table 11: List of ratios used in the SmartRatios model. Industry specific metrics are highlighted
Components Ratios
Banks Insurance Retail Airlines Utilities Oil
&
Gas
Profitability Return on capital
√
√
√
√
√
√
Profit Margin
√
√
√
√
√
√
Unrealized Losses
√
√
√
√
√
√
Change inLIFO Reserve
√
√
√
√
√
√
Operating Leverage
√
Combined ratio
√
Break-even Load
√
Passenger Load
√
Generation Cost
√
Assets/ Equity
Leverage
√
√
√
√
√
√
Unfunded Pension Liab
√
√
√
√
√
net Debt/ Equity
√
√
√
√
√
Tier 1 capital Ratio
√
Loans/ Deposits
√
EBITDA/ Interest
Coverage
√
√
√
√
√
Free Cash flow/Debt
√
√
√
√
√
EBIT/ Interest
√
√
√
√
√
Non-performing Loans
√
Loan-loss provision
√
Other Real-Estate Owned
√
Cash/Debt
Liquidity
√
√
√
√
√
√
short-term Debt/ Total Debt
√
√
√
√
√
√
Quick Ratio
√
√
√
√
Change in Quick Ratio
√
√
√
√
Change in Reserve
√
√
Fuel Reserve
√
Proven reserves
Normalized ROE Growth
Growth
√
√
√
√
√
√
Standard Deviation of EPS Growth
& Stability
√
√
√
√
√
√
Standard Deviation of Revenue
√
√
√
√
√
√
Growth
Same-Store Sales Growth
√
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All
Others
√
√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√
√

√
√
√

Source:StarMine SRCR

Figure 2: Construction of Starmine TMCR

Source: StarMine TMCR
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